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This study proposes a novel analytical technique in a case study 
of think tank brokerage. As brokers, think tanks structurally 
link foundations and media, yet they do so as representatives of 
a policy network consisting of corporate funders and affiliated 
think tanks. Print media sought their policy analysis regarding 
the welfare system and prescriptions for reform. Network and con-
tent methods are the bases for the presentation of the technique. 
The coupling of results from each of the technique’s components 
shows how resources tie actors, as well as how their conversion 
from one form to another is the basis for a newfound understand-
ing of structural brokerage. Taken together, the findings demon-
strate the significance of representative brokerage that deepens the 
meaning of the policy advocacy mission of these organizations.
Key words:  brokerage; social network analysis; content analysis; 
conservative think tanks; welfare reform
In recent decades, social scientists have examined the role 
of policy-planning organizations in the policy process. Interest 
ranges from think tanks’ relationship to the state (Abelson, 
1996; McGann & Weaver, 2000; Ricci, 1993), influence with 
the media (Abelson, 1992), interlocks with the corporate com-
munity (Burris, 1992; Moore, Sobieraj, Whitt, Mayorova, & 
Beaulieu, 2002), consensus-building roles (Burris, 2008; Carroll 
& Carson, 2003), policy-motivated funding support (Callahan, 
1999; Colwell, 1993; Covington, 1997; Lagemann, 1999; 
Messer-Davidow, 1993; Roelofs, 2003; Saloma, 1984), and the 
agenda-setting activities of think tanks in policy development 
(see Burch, 1997; Callahan, 1999; Covington, 1997; Jenkins 
& Shumate, 1985; McDonald, 2008; Messer-Davidow, 1993; 
Peschek, 1987; Ricci, 1993; Rich, 2004; Svihula & Estes, 2008; 
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at the state level is the appearance of think tanks as neutral, 
nonaligned policy organizations. Their tax-exempt status 
underscores this structural façade. However, as research has 
demonstrated, these organizations are anything but impartial 
to the “stability and reproduction of a system shaped by capi-
talist social relations” (Peschek, 1987, p. 216; see also Burris, 
2008; Carroll & Carson, 2003). They are entrusted as deputies 
of a network’s corporate interests (Gramsci, 1971, p. 6) that 
carry forward the general policy preferences of their corporate 
benefactors through several pipelines, including media. Prior 
research has examined their reliance upon (Abelson, 1992) as 
well as impact on the media (Dolny, 1996, 1997, 1998; Rich, 
2001). For example, news bureaus on the East Coast and in the 
Midwest seek last-minute comment from think tanks located 
on the West Coast before print deadlines (Katz, 2009, pp. 
12-13). This study examines the structural, intermediary loca-
tion between funding sources and transmitters of policy analy-
sis (see Figure 1), which is operationalized here as brokerage.
The ties that connect think tanks and media are derived 
from dual interests by both. Print media, for example, turn to 
authoritative sources to clarify complex, technical matters for 
their storylines and sometimes provide a forum in the op-ed 
section for individual analysts to champion policy matters. 
The think tanks sampled in this paper leverage this need for 
expertise by advocating their policy analysis. For example, the 
Heritage Foundation allocated 13% of its budget in the 1990s 
to marketing, including nearly half a million dollars for con-
sultants to assist them in these efforts (Georges, 1995). The 
president of Heritage stated they “stress an efficient, effective 
delivery system. Production is one side; marketing is equally 
important” (emphasis added) (Covington, 1997, p. 14). The 
president of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) similarly 
declared:
I make no bones about marketing… We pay as much 
attention to the dissemination of the product as we do 
the content. We’re probably the first major think tank to 
get into the electronic media. We hire ghost writers for 
scholars to produce op-ed articles that are sent to the 
one hundred and one cooperating newspapers—three 
pieces every two weeks. (p. 20)
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The newsprint media citations referenced in this case study 
are a consequence of concerted efforts by these organizations 
to market themselves as credible sources of policy expertise 
(Ricci, 1993; Rich, 2004). 
The present study seeks to broaden the research on think 
tanks by introducing a novel analytical technique that, if 
parsed, would appear as two distinct cases. Consisting of 
both network and content analyses, the technique’s quanti-
tative and qualitative structure is applied to a case study of 
conservative think tanks that participated in the development 
of welfare reform in the 1990s. Alone, each of these methods 
shed light on the network characteristics and semantic content 
of the think tanks’ relationships with foundations and media. 
These relationships are determined by the resource substance 
that establishes their ties: funding (i.e., capital) that connects 
foundations and think tanks; and policy analysis (i.e., infor-
mation) linking think tanks to media. Knowledge of the above 
linkages is not new. The objective of this study’s analytical 
technique is to operationalize brokerage that recognizes mixed 
resource types in the process of connecting structurally distinct 
groups of actors. The empirical research on brokerage is gener-
ally focused on the study of persons and a singular resource—
usually information. To proceed with the investigation, I pose 
two levels of questions, the first concerning each method:
At the network level, how is structural equivalence 
ascertained, and what does this indicate about a think 
tank’s similarity and dissimilarity with its peers? 
At the semantic level, what are the policy criticisms and 
reform prescriptions, and what does their frequency of 
appearance suggest?
This study’s mixed methods approach presents an oppor-
tunity to peer into brokerage, beyond observing how brokers 
link otherwise unconnected actors (for which they are known). 
The second set of hypotheses concerns the implications of 
combining these methods:
How similarly does network equivalence correspond 
with media impact?
160  Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
How is the resource structure of capital and information 
an indicator of brokerage? 
The point of the study is to present a systematic analy-
sis of think tanks that incorporates a broader understanding 
of structural brokerage in social network analysis (e.g., Burt, 
2005; Gould & Fernandez, 1989; Marsden, 1982; Rydgren, 2005) 
at the organizational level (Fernandez & Gould, 1994; Knoke, 
2009).
The social network analysis measures employed for the 
politically conservative policy network are drawn from finan-
cial ties between think tanks and private foundations that fund 
them. The procedures systematize the descriptive analysis of 
relational ties found in much of the literature regarding these 
organizations (see Roelofs, 2003; Saloma, 1984; Stefancic & 
Delgado, 1996). The dispensation of general operating grants 
for policy analysis by foundations sampled in this paper is not 
a common practice in the mainstream of private foundations 
(Colwell, 1993; Covington, 1997; Krehely, House, & Kernan, 
2004; Saloma, 1984; Stefancic & Delgado, 1996). This opera-
tional strategy portends a practice critical to the outcomes of 
think tank activities. As noted by other scholars, this type of 
resource commitment permits think tanks to shift organiza-
tional resources on an as-needed basis toward policy issues 
that may suddenly warrant their attention (Krehely et al., 
2004; Rich, 2004). The absence of project-specific grants that 
constrain an organization’s activities expands the autonomy 
of think tanks to engage in creative advocacy of the network’s 
policy preferences.
Foundations are generally regarded as passive institutions 
barred from directly engaging with the political process (e.g., 
campaign donations, lobbying, etc.). Yet, their bystander role 
does not mean they don’t exert influence regarding think tank 
activities. For instance, according to Covington (1997), “in 
1986, Olin and Smith Richardson foundations withdrew their 
support from [AEI] because of substantive disagreement with 
certain of its policies” leading to the resignation of its presi-
dent (p. 15). Krehely et al. (2004) noted that conservative foun-
dations have a high degree of interaction with grant recipients 
“meeting with them at least once formally during the year, 
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and several additional times informally at various conferenc-
es, retreats and meetings” (pp. 55-56). The structure of grant 
money identified in this study involves an exchange relation-
ship where one actor provides a valuable and needed resource 
(money) to another in return for the latter’s tacit conformity 
(Knoke, 1993). The competitive nature of fundraising-depen-
dent non-profit organizations reinforces the general interests 
of the funding party, in this case a category of philanthropies 
that prioritize support for policy analysis in their funding mis-
sions (Covington, 1997; Saloma, 1984). By combining content 
analysis of media ties with network measures, the politically 
conservative think tanks assume a structural role as the deputy 
of the foundations’ general policy preferences.
Brokerage
Brokerage refers to strategic actors that control or coordi-
nate the flow of network resources between clusters of actors 
(Marsden, 1982). Brokers facilitate the exchange of resources 
derived from bridging structural holes across networks (Burt, 
2005). The holes or gaps enable them to function as a resource 
bridge between actors and the networks they represent. Brokers 
may accrue benefits (e.g., status, promotion, experience, com-
missions, etc.) as a consequence of influencing resource flows. 
Brokerage demonstrates a distinct capability of linking 
otherwise disconnected actors (Gould & Fernandez, 1989; 
Marsden, 1982). Thus, brokers are visionaries of resource trans-
actions that might otherwise be unfulfilled. In a sense, they 
take advantage of opportunities either ignored or addressed 
on a limited basis. They manifest social capital by “detecting 
and developing rewarding opportunities” generated from ties 
—strong and weak, close and distant—to actors, social net-
works, or other social structures (Burt, 2005, p. 18; Everett & 
Borgatti, 2005). Social capital theory casts light on characteris-
tics of broker advantage, especially for self-interested purpos-
es. A recent study of organizational social capital found that 
possession of it by corporate alliances was key to facilitating 
(as well as limiting) opportunities in a multi-industry system 
(Knoke, 2009). 
Generally, brokerage is measured with betweenness 
centrality, a derivative measure in social network analysis. 
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Betweenness refers to an ego’s intermediary location between 
alters in a network. The alters depend on the ego’s between-
ness to connect them to distant alters (Scott, 2000). Betweenness 
centrality “recognizes that intermediate actors can control 
the messages passing through indirect channels” assumed to 
take place within a relatively restricted network of exchanges 
(Marsden, 1982, p. 205). This position confers a certain degree 
of power. Sociograms in network visualization software (such 
as Netdraw) illustrate an actor’s betweenness network loca-
tion which network scores alone are incapable of displaying 
(Scott, 2000). 
In Figure 1, conservative think tanks are positioned 
between structurally distant actors. This enables the ego 
grouping (i.e., conservative think tanks) to directly transmit 
resource-influenced policy interests to alters of significance 
(e.g., media) that could otherwise be channeled through indi-
rect, circuitous routes by remote actors. For example, practices 
think tanks frequently engage in for their constituents such as 
emails, workshops, conferences, or publications would yield 
limited policy diffusion. Though these practices may percolate 
to a mass audience, they may not be as effective in reaching it 
as broadly or efficiently as through the media, especially with 
hot-button legislation. The streamlining of that process has po-
tential benefits. Knoke (1990) suggested that “as the number 
of ties between actors decreases, power accruing to any one 
broker rises” (p. 144).
A recent essay by Everett and Borgatti (2005) proposes an 
extension of the betweenness centrality concept to the supra-
individual level by considering a set of actors’ attributes for 
analysis. They contend that attributes such as ethnicity, age, 
or occupation may be used as a source for group-level cen-
trality measurement. The operationalizing of this concept in 
this manner encourages problematizing brokerage beyond 
persons. Their approach extends our understanding of bro-
kerage, but nevertheless is limited to mediating roles within a 
network, where a singular resource is assumed to be transmit-
ted. This is consistent with the literature. The current paper’s 
technique sketches a structural brokerage role that integrates 
two seemingly distinct networks differentiated by the resource 
types. The conservative policy network is the core of the 
think tanks’ identity, but the media associated network is the 
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recipient of the base network’s interests. Hence information, 
not money, is the transmitted resource. Though not examined 
with traditional network measures, the latter network com-
pletes the picture of the think tanks’ structural role. 
Furthermore, the empirical research takes for granted 
the resource type, typically information, as the medium of 
exchange in brokers’ activities. The control of sought-after 
knowledge may translate into advantages for the intermedi-
ate holder of it. This applies to capital. Brokers, conscious or 
not, manipulate this exchange by virtue of their structural lo-
cation (Marsden, 1982). Thus, their role is dependent upon the 
patterns of relations between actors with whom they connect 
(Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Extant research also recognizes a 
broker’s resource utility to determine the activity role of the 
think tank (see ideal types in Gould & Fernandez, 1989). The 
present study considers brokers that traverse their core mem-
bership network to connect with organizational actors vis-à-vis 
the resources they exchange, which forms another network. I 
posit the two methods side-by-side.
The theoretical model of brokerage for this paper’s analysis 
is based on Gould and Fernandez’s (1989) concepts of informa-
tion transaction brokers. Brokers may perform any one or com-
bination of brokerage functions, but according to the authors, 
each transaction is exclusive to an ideal type, including: 
Coordinator: broker and actors are connected to similar 
group;
Cosmopolitan: actors being connected belong to the 
same group, but broker is outsider;
Representative: initiator of resource and broker belong 
to same group, but resource passes through broker as it 
leaves the group;
Gatekeeper: broker is the recipient of external resources 
and in the position to redistribute these (or not) to co-
members; and 
Liaison: broker and connecting actors each belong to 
disparate groups. 
For simplicity’s sake, conservative think tanks in this paper 
are viewed as performing a representative broker function. 
They carry forward the general policy preferences of their cor-
porate benefactors in their policy-related activities (Domhoff, 
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2010). The financial relationship between these actors is de-
scribed in much of the literature as an ideological policy 
network (e.g., Burris, 2008; Saloma, 1984). Trends in funding 
patterns, descriptions of policy philosophies, and identifica-
tion of similar policy goals underscore such networks (e.g., 
Arnove, 1980; Krehely et al., 2004; Saloma, 1984). Vasi (2011), 
however, argues that if two sub-groups comprising a network 
are ideologically compatible, the representative and gatekeep-
er brokers dissolve (i.e., miscible) into each other as one ideal 
type, or representative brokerage. While the policy goals of 
the private foundations and think tanks in this paper’s sample 
are compatible (e.g., support of free-market principles; conflict 
with the reach of the welfare state; etc.), think tank brokerage 
is not miscible. These organizations have distinct functions 
which are reinforced by tax law. Moreover, think tanks are not 
recipients of external funds that they redistribute to founda-
tions or think tanks in the policy network, as the gatekeeper 
role would suggest.
As mentioned previously, conservative think tanks are ex-
plicit about the bridge they engineer to disseminate their policy 
preferences. Burt (2005), however, contends brokers do not 
optimize their access to structural holes. In other words, they 
do not necessarily set out to be brokers. “People vary in their 
ability to detect holes in social structure … and inaccurately di-
agnose the value of their network” (p. 28). The target audience 
for think tank policy analysis is lawmakers, but perhaps their 
policy advocacy facilitated a rethinking of the relationship 
bridge to media as a by-product of this goal (Burt, 2005). As 
Burt and others (Marsden, 1982) have shown, brokers emerge 
organically, based in part on actors' needs in a network.
Data and Methods
The primary unit of analysis for this study is the think 
tanks from which the resource-based ties to foundations 
and print media are constructed. First, a purposive sample 
of eleven conservative foundations were identified reputa-
tionally from “actors widely believed by knowledgeable ob-
servers to have the actual or potential power to ‘move and 
shake’ the system” (Knoke, 1993, p. 30; also see Campbell, 
2000). Reputational sampling is problematic, but it sufficed to 
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demonstrate the technique. Studies of philanthropic founda-
tions that program monies for policy analysis identify them in 
a variety of ways, including samples derived: with a minimum 
asset level ($10 million) and a minimum annual percentage of 
grants (5%) awarded toward public policy analysis (Colwell, 
1993, pp. 10-11); annual grant-making totaling over a million 
dollars (Covington, 1997; Howell, 1995; Saloma, 1984); or 
through snowball sampling (Allen, 1992; Stefancic & Delgado, 
1996). Their identified reputation in the literature then led to 
an examination of mission statements outlining their general 
policy principles located on their websites or in annual reports. 
The mission statements reflect their political philosophies re-
garding the function of the welfare state and economy. The 
group of conservative foundations identified include: Bradley 
Foundation (BF); Carthage Foundation (CF); Castle Rock 
Foundation (CRF); Adolph Coors Foundation (ACF); Earhart 
Foundation (EF); JM Foundation (JMF); Philip M. McKenna 
Foundation (PMF); John M. Olin Foundation (JOF); Smith 
Richardson Foundation, Inc. (SRF); Scaife Family Foundation 
(SFF); and Sarah Scaife Foundation (SSF).
Second, conservative think tanks identified in this article 
for years 1992 to 1994 were also subjected to the reputational 
criteria. The literature on these organizations identifies as few 
as a handful to as many as one hundred and eight conserva-
tive think tanks (Allen, 1992; Callahan, 1999; Covington, 1997; 
Howell, 1995; Ricci, 1993; Rich, 2004; Saloma, 1984; Smith, 
1991; Stefancic & Delgado, 1996; Stoesz, 1987). For example, 
Covington (1997) identified the top eighteen grant-receiv-
ing think tanks between 1992 and 1994. Five of the six think 
tanks that I sample appear consistently in the top tier of those 
most frequently cited by media (Dolny, 1996, 1997, 1998). We 
can reasonably expect these organizations to express similar 
policy preferences with major pieces of legislation, especially 
in regards to reforms in the social welfare state that call for 
a ‘limited government, personal responsibility, and free enter-
prise.’ The differences in policy prescription reflect reform dis-
agreements but are not cleavers of a fundamental philosophy 
as it regards the welfare state or economy. Further examination 
of welfare-related policy areas on their websites, such as federal 
government deregulation of health and human services, were 
indicators of their policy preference vis-à-vis welfare reform. 
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The content analysis is the qualitative aspect of the paper’s 
technique. The sample of think tanks for this paper’s tech-
nique is not meant to be exhaustive. The focus is not exclusive 
to the top reputable organizations nor to frequency of media 
citations regarding welfare reform or the welfare state. Rather, 
the focus is on how to demonstrate one half of the technique. 
Three of the six think tanks have national and international 
policy scopes, and the other half tend to restrict themselves to 
domestic and/or regional issues. 
The sample of think tanks consisting of the paper’s conser-
vative policy network include: American Enterprise Institute 
(AEI); Cato Institute; Heritage Foundation; Hudson Institute; 
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research; and National Center 
for Policy Analysis (NCPA). The first three are located in 
Washington D.C. The Manhattan Institute is located in New 
York City, the Hudson Institute in Wisconsin, and NCPA in 
Texas. Although it would be ideal to have data from a larger 
sample of think tanks and more newspaper articles over more 
years, the presentation of this paper’s technique is a useful first 
step.
Network Analysis
The ties connecting think tanks with conservative founda-
tions are motivated by philosophies and established through 
money. I apply network analysis on two grounds: (1) to discern 
relationships of mutual interest where one set of actors (i.e., 
foundations) provides resources to another group of actors 
(i.e., think tanks) to buttress the latter’s activities (Domhoff, 
2010; Knoke, 1993; Krehely et al., 2004); and (2) to explore the 
extent to which policy network equivalence is similar to their 
frequency of media citations. The former investigates charac-
teristics in the network and the latter examines whether the 
patterning of network similarities is comparable to their ap-
pearance in print media. Media coverage is a means for foun-
dations to monitor the success of grant-receiving think tanks 
(Krehely et al., 2004). The network relationships are exam-
ined vis-à-vis structural equivalence and relational network 
measures.
The UCINET 6 software program (Borgatti, Everett, & 
Freeman, 2002) was used to render scores and mapping from 
sociomatrices representing the think tanks’ financial ties to 
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foundations. Three measures in network analysis calculate 
structural similarity in membership and relational characteris-
tics: affiliation, density, and cluster analyses. Affiliation analy-
sis measures how think tanks are connected with each other as 
a result of receiving grants from a set of foundations. Density 
measures the proportion of actual ties to the maximum possible 
relations (Scott, 2000). To what extent do think tank ties with 
foundations represent network cohesion? Cluster analysis is a 
procedure for identifying subsets of actors based on their struc-
tural similarities. Think tanks may be similar (or dissimilar) to 
one another in terms of their network ties (direct and indirect) 
determined by their grant-receiving patterns. Thus, clusters 
are contingent on the density levels found (Scott, 2000). 
This paper assumes that grant-receipt ties are expressions 
of trust (Krehely et al., 2004; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 
2001). It considers Knoke and Laumann’s (1982) concept of a 
policy domain whose organizational members are recognized 
by “specifying a substantively defined criterion of mutual rel-
evance or common orientation … concerned with formulating, 
advocating, and selecting courses of action” to analyze prob-
lems associated with the policy (p. 256). The policy domain’s 
time frame for this study is 1992 through 1994. The time frame 
represents a brief period in the run-up to welfare reform enacted 
in 1996. As Withorn (1998) and others point out, welfare reform 
was a path-breaking policy that galvanized various segments 
of conservatism (O’Connor, 2001; Piven, 2004; Williams, 1997), 
including the sample of think tanks and foundations in this 
paper. 
Content Analysis
The second step of the paper’s technique is an analysis of 
the network’s policy preferences represented by what think 
tanks articulate and what is attributed to them. What do they 
convey, in what frequency, and what are the implications of 
both? Articles from U.S.-based dailies containing references 
or op-ed articles by conservative think tank representatives 
were searched. Keywords—welfare, welfare reform, depen-
dency, and poverty—were searched alongside the names of 
each organization. For example, claims decrying the wasteful-
ness of the federal government’s social spending were located 
along with similar assertions about the government spending 
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trillions on programs since the War on Poverty was declared 
in 1965. Much of the coding depended on a latent semantic 
analysis of themes that relied on a reading of works by authors 
self-identified as conservatives, such as George Gilder (1981), 
Charles Murray (1984), Lawrence Mead (1986) and Marvin 
Olasky (1995) on the social welfare state and welfare reform.
I coded for two conceptually broad themes that took one of 
two shapes: criticism of the welfare system (including the role 
of the state and its policies) and policy reform prescriptions. 
These dichotomous categories are a partition of what appeared 
after sub-categories were constructed. Ten percent of the news-
paper articles (i.e., 23 of 230) were sampled. This procedure 
drew eight sub-categories, later clarified with a thorough ex-
amination of all the newspaper articles. A total of 594 content 
units were gleaned from the universe of articles obtained elec-
tronically through searches in Academic Universe (Lexis/
Nexis) and ProQuest Newstand from 53 of the most important 
newspapers available in the United States.
Table 1. Think Tank Affiliations, Aggregate (3 years)
HF AEI CATO MI HI NCPA
HF 9 8 4 7 6 7
AEI 8 10 5 8 7 7
CATO 4 5 5 5 5 4
MI 7 8 5 9 8 7
HI 6 7 5 8 8 6
NCPA 7 7 4 7 6 8
Key: HF=Heritage Foundation; AEI=American Enterprise Institute; CATO=Cato 




The first research question directs our attention to struc-
tural similarities. The affiliation ties representing think tank 
membership with foundations was aggregated for years 
1992 to 1994 (see Table 1). The row-by-column cells for each 
think tank to itself represent the cumulative number of 
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foundations from which it received grant awards over this 
period. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) obtained foun-
dation monies from ten of the eleven possible foundations. 
Manhattan and Heritage received the second most grants from 
nine foundations. The adjacent row-by-column cells indicate 
the overlap that a think tank has with its network colleagues. 
Again, by way of example, Heritage and AEI shared eight 
foundations from which they received grants.
Density analysis paints a picture of the degree to which 
foundations and think tanks intermingle, suggesting network 
cohesion. For this reason, matrices in each year were coded in 
binary form representing either the presence or absence of a 
tie. A perfect score of 1 means all possible links are filled, while 
0 indicates no linkage. Density for 1992 was .590. In 1993 it 
was .545, and in 1994 it yielded .393. The aggregated density 
of the overall network (11 foundations by 6 think tanks) is .510 
for the three years of grant analysis. This score indicates that 
at least fifty-one percent of all possible grant donations from 
every foundation were distributed to every think tank, thus 
constituting a network. 
Table 2. Hierarchical Think Tank Clusters, Aggregate (3 years)
CATO HF AEI MI HI NCPA
45.00 X X
41.00 X X X
34.07 X X X X
26.23 X X X X X
19.13 X X X X X X
Key: HF=Heritage Foundation; AEI=American Enterprise Institute; CATO=Cato 
Institute; MI=Manhattan Institute; HI=Hudson Institute; NCPA=National Center for 
Policy Analysis
I now turn to cluster analysis to represent sub-groups 
or clusters based on similar characteristics of grant-receipt. 
Following Johnson’s (1967) hierarchal clustering, I ranked the 
most similar think tanks near the top, followed by groupings 
of increasingly heterogeneous actors at each level below. The 
scores represent discrete thresholds that indicate the average 
level of actor similarities for that cluster (see Table 2). At each 
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regarding welfare reform issues were identified from a uni-
verse of 230 newspapers articles between 1992 and 1994. Two 
broad thematic categories were underscored by the eight 
primary themes that emerged upon closer semantic inspec-
tion of the articles (see Table 3). The first category contends 
the welfare system is a pernicious social policy that: (a) is 
costly, inefficient, and harmful because it is administered by 
the federal government; (b) has far-reaching consequences, 
including adverse effects on the welfare participants’ partici-
pation in the labor force, child-bearing and -rearing, and mar-
riage stability; (c) doesn’t alleviate poverty nor dissuade the 
poor from relying on general assistance; (d) misrepresents real 
poverty and minimizes abundant prosperity; and (e) relies on 
liberals' misguided assumptions about the state and the poor.
Table 3. The Conservative Policy Network’s Claims of Welfare 
Reform, 1992-1994
Theme Description N %
Thematic Category One: Pernicious Welfare System
1 Criticism of Welfare Programs/State 117 20
2 Pernicious Social Effects of Welfare 190 32
3 Criticism of Liberal Support for Welfare 29 5
4 Poor are Better Off 47 8
Total: 383 65
Thematic Category Two: Welfare Reform Prescription
5 Welfare Reform Goals 87 14
6 Welfare Reform Objectives 93 16
7 Welfare Reform Predictions 20 3
8 Private Sector Alternative 11 2
Total 211 35
Totals 594 100
The results indicate that the social effects of the welfare 
system have the highest thematic content units, followed by 
criticism of the welfare system and welfare reform objectives 
and goals. Parsing all of the content units year by year saw 
a steady increase between 1992 and 1993 from one hundred 
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twenty-four to one hundred forty-nine recorded references. 
There was a dramatic increase in 1994, with three hundred 
twenty-one content units seen in nearly all of the thematic clas-
sifications led by theme two, with one hundred twenty-two 
references (38%). Themes two and five also had the highest in-
creases in 1994, escalating forty-two percent and forty percent 
from the year before. Themes four and eight each decreased. 
The assertion that the poor live better (theme four) was an 
unanticipated theme that contained forty-seven references 
between 1992 and 1993. but dropped to three references in 
1994.
There were a wide variety of claims about the inadequacy 
of the welfare system in category one. For example, Michael 
Tanner (1994) at CATO asserted the federal government had 
“spent more than $3.5 trillion on social-welfare programs since 
the Great Society of the 1960s. Yet the poverty rate today is 
higher than when we began” (p. 12A). According to William 
J. Bennett (1992), fellow at Hudson and Heritage, “Americans 
have developed an unhealthy reliance on, and unrealistic ex-
pectations about, what the federal government will do for 
them. We have to begin to alter people’s assumptions about 
the federal government’s role” (p. A17). David Murray (1994) 
at Heritage equated welfare participation with marriage, 
stating, "In America, we are pursuing the dangerous course of 
replacing families with the indifferent welfare state, now the 
official pater of vast numbers of children. Welfare mothers are 
marrying the state, as it were…" (p. 18). 
Disputing official poverty statistics and assumptions 
about the poor, Robert Rector at Heritage claimed, “For most 
Americans, poverty means destitution, an inability to provide 
a family with nutritious food, clothing and reasonable shelter. 
Only a small number … fit that description” (Ross, 1993, p. 
22). The net effect of misleading poverty figures by the Census 
Bureau that inflate government spending, argued Rector, is 
“millions of children who grow up without fathers, adults 
who lack the work ethic and the dignity it provides, and entire 
generations robbed of real dreams and hopes for the future” 
(Rector, 1992, p. A10). Underscoring an assumption about the 
pernicious effects of the welfare system, Walter Olson (1992) 
of the Manhattan Institute claimed, “almost everyone who 
gets a job in this country escapes poverty. Yet poor adults are 
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working much less than they used to, and most do not work 
at all. The problem is absence from the labor force…” (p. A14). 
In a review of a book by Myron Magnet of the Manhattan 
Institute, the columnist George Will summarized the thesis of 
the book in the following manner:   
Since the 1960s such central institutions as the law, 
universities, public schools, the welfare and mental 
health systems have been permeated with [liberal] 
1960s values. Often the changes have been driven 
by a perverse premise—that the social order is an 
infringement on freedom rather than freedom’s 
foundation. (1993, p. C7)
The second thematic category shifts towards policy pre-
scriptions. Welfare reform goals and objectives comprise the 
primary thrust in this section. For example, Charles Murray 
(1993), fellow at AEI in the 1990s, proposed ending all support 
to single mothers stating, “The AFDC (Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children) payment goes to zero. Single mothers 
are not eligible for subsidized housing or for food stamps” (p. 
A14) in an editorial that garnered the attention of Congress 
and the White House. Rector (1994) argued in an op-ed that 
the general goals of welfare reform should be the elimination 
of “illegitimacy, divorce and non-work” (p. 7B).
Policy proposals included such recommendations as de-
volving the federal government’s role to the states, requiring 
work and education for program participation, and displac-
ing the state with the private sector. Charles Finn, Jr., of the 
Hudson Institute, stated “nobody in Washington should tell 
people at home what to do or how to do it,” (cited in Walters, 
1994, p. 1) implying that states understood their population’s 
needs better than an intrusive federal government. Arguing 
about the primacy of the free market, Burton Yale Pines, Vice 
President at Heritage, said “it is economic growth that makes 
it possible for living standards to increase for nearly every 
American. It is growth that defeats poverty. Reagan reminded 
America that government cannot create economic growth and 
that government generally is the enemy of economic growth” 
(cited in Thomas, 1994, p. G-04). The NCPA suggested a trans-
fer of the welfare system’s administration to the private sector 
(Fund, 1994).
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Discussion
At the outset of this study I claimed that its purpose was 
to re-explore the descriptive research approach taken in work 
about think tanks in a systematic manner. Their structural role 
is operationalized as brokerage with an analytical technique 
instigated by a case study of conservative think tanks that par-
ticipated in 1990s welfare reform. The technique was devised 
from knowledge of these actors’ resource induced ties derived 
from their media-related policy advocacy and relationship to 
private financing. Thus two sets of questions were asked. The 
first set dealt with each of the methodological components: the 
relational and affiliational characteristics of the think tanks and 
a semantic interpretation and frequency count of their policy 
preferences in print media. Each of these paints a fractured 
picture of their activities. The second set of questions concerns 
the implications for integrating each method and is, in a sense, 
the core of the study’s focus. The resource types—bookmarked 
on the receiving and diffusion ends—that tied these brokers to 
peripheral yet integral organizations motivated the third and 
fourth research questions. It is the second set I discuss below.
Structural Equivalence and its Qualitative Cousin
The standard network analysis procedures of the tech-
nique illustrate the social context of think tank relations and 
affiliation emanating from financial ties. Other network mea-
sures could be substituted to demonstrate the existence of a 
network. However, the third research question suggests that 
the affiliation and cluster measures derived from depen-
dence on donor money may influence what policy issues 
they consider and how they articulate prescriptions of them. 
Preference for the dominance of the private sector over an in-
trusive welfare state and its policies, like general cash assis-
tance (i.e., welfare), is evident in both the foundations’ mission 
statements and think tanks’ media advocacy. The autonomous 
implication of general operating grants, however, does not di-
minish the need to satisfy the intent of institutional donors. 
The structural equivalence findings point to a competitive rela-
tionship (Knoke & Yang, 2008) between think tanks as a result 
of their similar ties to foundations. As non-profits, they try to 
garner as many financial donations as possible from these and 
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other like-minded sources. We may speculate that the public 
disclosure of grant recipients in either foundation reports or 
their IRS 990-PF tax filings “encourages [think tanks] to model 
their beliefs and behaviors after one another” (Knoke, 1990, 
p. 11). Looking at Table 1 suggests all but CATO are aggres-
sive in their fundraising strategies towards the set of founda-
tions in the network. However, as media reports have pointed 
out, CATO derives significant amounts of resources from one 
of its founding and still active board members, the billionaire 
Charles G. Koch, thus their relatively lower structural equiva-
lence scores.
Turning to the media advocacy results, we find how the think 
tanks collectively put their stamp on welfare reform. It would 
be presumptuous to equate network results and frequency of 
media appearances as compatible measures. Nevertheless, the 
premise of this study’s brokerage analysis rests on the proposi-
tion that a key resource (i.e., policy analysis) that these organi-
zations manifest is a consequence of its network representative 
role. Combining any quantitative measure with a qualitative 
one raises the question of compatibility. Let’s look at AEI by 
way of example. It was the organization most connected to 
foundations through grants in all three years (see Table 1), but 
was referenced by print media the second most during the 
three-year period. Does this mean it had the second most effect 
among the sampled think tanks towards the development of 
welfare reform? A closer inspection of its policy proposals sug-
gests it may have been the most influential think tank with 
welfare reform. AEI’s Charles Murray, a leading voice of con-
servative thought on welfare reform, was praised by President 
Clinton for arguing that unwed births were a social problem 
made worse by the welfare system (Bennett & Wehner, 1994). 
Many scholars concluded that President Clinton assimilated 
many of the assumptions put forth by conservative commenta-
tors on welfare reform, as evidenced by the provisions of the 
bill he signed in 1996 (e.g., Goldberg & Collins, 2001). 
In another example regarding to the third research ques-
tion, CATO had the lowest affiliated score in the policy 
network, but had the third highest occurrence of media cita-
tions for 1994. Perhaps CATO turned toward welfare reform 
analysis with more resources after the Clinton administration’s 
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national health care initiative, a policy this organization was 
highly critical of, was perceived as declining in public support 
(Rushefsky & Patel, 1997). Furthermore, when we compare 
actors in the densest cluster, consisting of AEI, Manhattan, and 
Hudson, we find only AEI with a significant amount of media 
references. Yet, Manhattan and Hudson were early advocates 
of devolving the federal government’s role onto the states, an 
idea that was incorporated in the form of block grants found 
in the final bill. This funding mechanism permitted each state 
to dispense general assistance based on participation criteria 
and time-limits that they determined. Perhaps the proposal 
to devolve the state’s role was a foregone conclusion to the 
outcome of welfare reform and more did not need to be articu-
lated; this may have resulted in higher media frequency counts 
for these proponents, had it been otherwise.
Herein lays the utility of the qualitative aspect of the tech-
nique that complicates how compatible it is with its network 
cousin. It is through content analysis that the think tanks’ policy 
preferences are identified. This does two things. First, it system-
atizes the think tanks’ collective leanings on a policy issue by 
identifying, grouping, and calculating macro- and meso-level 
themes. I arrived at two macro-level themes consisting of the 
problematic features of existing welfare policy and reform pre-
scriptions. The sub-categories in each articulate the collective 
stamp these actors put on welfare reform. Second, this method 
further identifies the thematic foci for each of these actors over 
a three-year period as they articulated it. I was able to identify 
who said what and compare them to claims-making in the nar-
rative literature (e.g., Reese, 2005). The former is encapsulated 
in Table 3 and the latter in the descriptive results shown above. 
A surprising finding in the results yet not addressed in the 
literature was the claim that the poor are materially privileged, 
thus welfare programs are unnecessary (Table 3, Theme 4). It 
was a compelling argument buttressed with data about mate-
rial comfort (e.g., TV sets and microwaves owned per capita) 
the poor enjoy today relative to the past. Though flawed in 
their assumptions and analysis, this claim underscores the 
long-standing myth that state relief indulges an indolent, ma-
terially privileged class that should be employed. 
Most of the think tanks’ print media advocacy described 
a pernicious welfare system. Criticism of welfare programs 
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(Theme 1) coupled with assertions about the social damage it 
inflicts (Theme 2) were the overall top claims. This is fitting 
with a study by McCright and Dunlap (2000) that analyzed the 
significance of conservative forces’ counter-claims to recast the 
scientific consensus over global climate change. By not only 
casting doubt but also redirecting the terms of policy debate 
to include their policy views, these organizations were able to 
insert themselves as legitimate alternative policy authorities, 
despite being an insignificant minority within the scientific 
community (McCright & Dunlap, 2010). In a similar fashion, 
the results in Table 1 demonstrate the significance of persistent 
claims-making about the deficits of the welfare system years 
before welfare reform was enacted. Welfare reform had pre-
viously taken place in 1988, and it included provisions about 
work participation, education, and greater local control with 
which conservative policy analysts appeared content. Yet 
welfare reform was resurrected in 1992, and conservative think 
tanks took a vociferous stance about the welfare state’s desta-
bilizing effect on individual liberty. Perhaps forging a consen-
sus about this argument unlocked the box of provisions in the 
1996 law advocated by conservative think tanks. 
The newer prescriptions, minor by comparison, were no 
less significant. Many of the provisions that conservative think 
tanks advocated for (Table 3, Them 6)—devolution of program 
administration to states; replacement of previous entitlement 
features with a block grant program to states; lifetime partici-
pation limits; work requirements; family caps; and participa-
tion restrictions for immigrants—were codified in the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, or welfare reform. Further investigation of similar data 
from 1995 and 1996 is needed to determine how claims-mak-
ing of welfare system deficits and prescriptions to remedy 
them correspond with each other over time. 
Brokerage Reconsidered
The fourth research question focused on the interplay of 
mixed resources in brokerage. The illustration of the conser-
vative think tanks’ structural location in Figure 1 identifies 
the two distinct groupings of peripheral actors—foundations 
and print media—that think tanks connect. But these ties are 
not restricted to a single or communication-based tie, as the 
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brokerage literature generally assumes. This study delves 
deeper into the representational structure of conservative 
think tank brokerage in pursuit of a public forum for the policy 
preferences of its benefactors. In doing so, these representa-
tive actors bridge the structural hole Burt (2005) regards as 
a basis of brokerage, taking advantage of media’s search for 
policy expertise on complicated matters (Abelson, 1992; Katz, 
2009). Thus, structural advantage is levied by think tanks in 
the process of identifying and matching the interests of periph-
eral actors. 
The study’s analytical technique recognizes the implicit 
resource transformation of capital into information. The nomi-
nally unrestricted structure of general operating grants and the 
funding patterns established by the foundations enables think 
tanks to fashion their policy analysis within the ideological con-
tours associated with their benefactors’ policy philosophies. 
The resource conversion is suited for the financially dependent 
think tanks. Their non-profit status limits their revenue gen-
erating activities. Smaller think tanks, like the NCPA, depend 
on as much as fifty-two percent of their funding from founda-
tions, while the more diversified organizations, like Heritage 
and AEI, rely on twenty to twenty-two percent of their budgets 
from this source. Thus, foundation grants are indispensable. 
Therefore, the development and dissemination of think tank 
policy analysis is contingent on these resources. Foundations 
can monitor the amount and quality of press coverage their 
grant recipients receive. All of the think tanks in the case study, 
like many of their peers, tout their media appearances on their 
websites. The analytical technique captures the relational and 
resource bases of their brokerage. 
The intellectual opinion role of academics, writers, policy-
makers, and other authorities in media is well established. The 
marketing commitments of conservative think tanks merely 
exploit this in a concerted manner. But two additional factors 
require further examination. First, think tank policy analysts 
are free from many, not all, of the institutional and resource 
constraints imposed on many of these aforementioned opinion 
leaders. This is critical to understanding the time, energy, and 
creative inputs in the development and dissemination of policy 
analysis when constraints are removed or minimized. While 
Burt (2005) and others regard brokerage as circumstantial, 
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there may be work-place or network characteristics that have 
a higher propensity for brokerage development. Networks are 
where action takes place. Identifying characteristics of these 
environment producing networks may yield some answers as 
to why brokerage occurs among some peers and not others 
who participate in the same industry. We should not take it as 
a given that brokerage just happens. Second, a neutral, non-
partisan façade may correspond with brokerage. For example, 
the policy analyses of conservative think tanks in the case 
study generally align with the Republican Party platform, 
though their 501 © 3 status prevents them from lobbying and 
other political activities that are not educational in nature. 
Notwithstanding their legal status, think tanks or other policy 
brokers may exploit niche contexts with media and the public 
alike as neutral third-parties distant from partisan interests of 
either major political party. Perhaps actors’ impartial status is 
more likely to correspond with their intermediary location as 
resource interlocutors, but further analysis is needed.
Conclusion
Scholars of elite think tanks have examined their involve-
ment in the policy arena in various ways. The mission of think 
tanks in general is to alter the policy landscape. Their relation-
ships with legislators and governing bodies, the media, and 
their funders work towards that end. The ways in which they 
knead these relationships have important implications for how 
policy preferences are disseminated to and received by scores 
of constituents. For instance, the debate over climate change 
and the validity of scientific claims regarding it are a function 
of the input by conservative think tanks (McCright & Dunlap, 
2003). A systematic understanding of these relationships is 
necessary for these and other organizational actors as it relates 
to their structural roles.
This paper introduced a novel analytical technique that 
extends our understanding of brokerage. Question four sug-
gests that brokerage is determined by resource types and the 
context of their resource-based relationships. It is composed of 
a dual formulation of methods at the relational and semantic 
levels that examine the social structure of resource-based rela-
tionships. The context of these relationships is interpreted as a 
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representative type of broker. The nature of the foundations’ 
funding commitment as an expression of trust, structurally 
delegates think tanks to articulate a policy stance. The content 
analysis results indicate two things: directly, the policy prefer-
ences of conservative think tanks as expressed in Table 3; in-
directly, ties to media as result of media’s coverage with these 
organization’s policy preferences.
The present study advances the theoretical and method-
ological approaches to brokerage by outlining its quantitative 
and qualitative properties. What is the resource content of bro-
kerage? While this article analyzes the mediating role of orga-
nizational actors in relation to disparate actors, its approach 
can be replicated for persons in a restricted network when 
both events and persons or organizations are represented. But 
the study’s analytical technique is inhibited by constraints 
that content analysis imposes. Mining the qualitative data is 
time consuming. The larger the sample, the greater the room 
for error. Nevertheless, researchers can continue investigating 
brokerage dynamics that traverse networks to connect with 
external environments. We need better mapping of brokers’ 
mediating role between distinct and seemingly unconnected 
entities to understand, for instance, issues of power as it relates 
to resource conversion, control, and diffusion.
A concomitant interest in social networks and globaliza-
tion will certainly generate questions about the form and 
content of roles that tie distant actors. Are their differences 
between brokers in the for-profit and nonprofit private sector? 
Are they more prevalent in the public sector? How does bro-
kerage in marketing compare with brokerage of an espionage 
nature? How do state actors function as brokers for the private 
sector, as research seems to suggest they do for multinational 
corporations? Are non-governmental organizations brokers 
for justice? Research questions such as these necessitate a the-
oretical and methodological approach along the lines of this 
paper’s technique to understand that the most visible actors 
in any sector are not necessarily the most significant ones to 
facilitating or constraining the flow of resources to dependent 
actors. 
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